Turkish Military Presence in Northern Iraq and its Implications

While the Kurdish cause often triggers spontaneous expressions of solidarity around the world after specific events, the Turkish military presence in Northern Iraq is a quite neglected aspect of this conflict. Currently, Turkey has up to 87 military bases in Northern Iraq without the consent of the Iraqi government, effectively violating the country's sovereignty on a scale and in a manner that some could interpret as an act of war. Although the exact number is difficult to determine, the Turkish government has officially admitted to at least 37 bases while falsely claiming that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq has given its consent. Turkey justifies this situation by arguing that, in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, it is acting in self-defense against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which uses KRG territory to launch attacks inside Turkey. Moreover, while around 4.000 Turkish troops are believed to be deployed, they are not only targeting the PKK but also engaging with Iraqi Kurds, with civilian casualties extending to non-Kurdish Iraqis. While Turkey’s incursions into Iraq date back to the 1990s, the scale and Baghdad’s lack of consent are a novelty with significant implications.   

Firstly, these incursions undermine Iraqi sovereignty and significantly diminish any support that remains for the federal government. While the government often expresses opposition verbally, it is humiliating that the state is unable to prevent the encroachment on its own territory by a neighbor for military purposes. Most importantly, it affects the KRG, which has historically been divided between its two main parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), with the former being the dominant one. In this complex dynamic, it is important to stress that neither KDP nor PUK welcome the PKK’s presence, as they are fully aware it gives Turkey a pretext to invade KRG territory. Despite the KRG's possession of an experienced fighting force in the form of the Peshmerga, they would still be at a disadvantage against one of the largest NATO armies. Consequently, Iraq is unable to put an end to this presence, while the West focuses on the war in Ukraine and has no desire to upset a vital ally like Turkey.  Moreover, the extensive Turkish military presence, coupled with non-PKK casualties, radicalizes the local population, shifting their allegiance away from the passive KDP and PUK towards the more violent and confrontational PKK. Turkey skillfully exploits the local political environment, dividing the Kurds on how to respond and simultaneously establishing a significant and powerful military presence.

Simultaneously, Iran is also taking advantage of the situation. With its own persecution of the Kurdish minority, especially after the Mahsa Amini protests, Iran fears a strong KRG and thus welcomes internal strife and weakening of the Kurdish autonomy. It has also taken advantage more directly, with pro-Iranian Iraqi militias striking KRG Peshmerga targets. In fact, the overall gain for Tehran is even greater. With Baghdad and Erbil only expressing verbal condemnations, Hashd al-Shabi can present itself as the only defenders of Iraqi sovereignty. Through its Iraqi allies, Tehran achieves three significant objectives: weakening the Kurdish institution along its border, potentially using proxies to attack its geopolitical rival Turkey, and allowing these proxies to gain legitimacy by presenting themselves as the only political entity in Iraq defending national sovereignty.

Finally, it is worth noting that Turkey holds significant leverage over Iraq. Controlling its water supply by damming the upstream rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates, and having a huge economic advantage as 90% of products in Iraqi shopping malls are of Turkish origin, not to reiterate the vast military asymmetry. As the Iranian proxies in the country do not pose a significant threat, as they are more likely to employ only limited force to gain legitimacy and support, Turkey’s presence in the KRG is likely to expand. With no opposing actor possessing the capacity to halt this expansion and it serving as an extremely convenient political tool, Turkey's influence is expected to grow.