The Challenges of Normalizing Saudi-Israeli Relations

Ever since the 2020 Abraham Accords, there have been numerous discussions and speculations about whether Saudi Arabia will follow its Gulf neighbors in recognizing the state of Israel. This speculation has gained momentum, especially after the 2022 Jeddah Summit and the steady improvement of Saudi-Israeli relations. These developments have raised expectations that such a deal is not only possible but also probable. These heightened expectations have been acknowledged by the leaders and officials of both states, not to mention the countless experts and media outlets. Additionally, the mutual visits by senior Saudi and Israeli officials in September 2023 reinforce the message that the parties involved believe a deal is attainable. However, despite the eagerness of the mediating U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia to finalize such an agreement, each actor will have to navigate a delicate balancing act in both international and domestic politics. This means that even if this initiative comes to fruition, it will take time and effort, with several opportunities for failure.

While the perception of Iran as an existential threat by both Saudi Arabia and Israel creates a convergence of interests that drives cooperation, Saudi Arabia's expectations for this deal are much broader. Firstly, there is a strong insistence on security guarantees from the US. The Saudis would ideally desire a formal treaty that would make any attack against Saudi Arabia an attack against the United States. However, this is highly unlikely, as such a move would require 67 votes in the US Senate, and should be treated more as a starting negotiating position rather than a realistic policy objective. The question is whether the two parties can find a middle ground that satisfies Saudi security concerns and aligns with the Biden administration’s domestic commitments. There are several possibilities in this case. One option could be to follow the model of Bahrain or American allies in Asia, as less extensive security commitments do not require congressional approval but are still significant and effective. Moreover, granting Saudi Arabia a Major Non-NATO Ally Status is certainly on the table, especially as countries such as Kuwait or Jordan already possess it, and it is something the Saudis are likely to push for. Any agreement included within the deal could serve as a starting point for broader security agreements just as it was with the Abraham Accords, when initial pledges made to Bahrain were expanded in September 2023. Nevertheless, the security dimension is probably the least problematic, as the second aspect of Saudi conditions concerns a civilian nuclear programme.

As a part of the deal, Saudi Arabia wants the United States to provide the technology necessary to build a civilian nuclear programme, including a domestic enrichment facility, something the United States have never provided to another country. This aspect is especially complex, as such an agreement would strike at the heart of America’s decades-long non-proliferation policy and would create a precedent, contributing to regional proliferation of nuclear power. Moreover, with an enrichment facility, the Saudis would possess the ability to independently enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels; as indirectly indicated by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman when he stated that if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon, so would Saudi Arabia. In this case there have been speculations that a US-operated facility on Saudi soil might be a solution acceptable to both parties. However, there would still be significant domestic opposition in the US, along with the threat of regional proliferation.

There is also a complicated aspect concerning Palestine. As Saudi Arabia spearheaded and co-signed the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API), which aimed to normalize Arab-Israeli relations on the condition of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, ultimately achieving the two-state solution. There is strong pressure on the Gulf state to uphold the API’s conditions and recognize Israel only if it fulfills its part of the bargain. For the Saudis, this aspect is probably the least important, as they are likely to prioritize their own interests over those of the Palestinians, especially with regional stability and expanding economic relations with Israel being significant factors in the Saudi Vision 2030. However, a deal violating the API’s commitments would certainly cause international and domestic backlash. The Saudis are thus looking for a solution that shows solidarity with Palestine but is also acceptable to the Israelis. It is highly unlikely that an Israeli government would agree to the comprehensive conditions of the API, so a less extensive agreement is expected. This is indicated by the vague and ambiguous language used by all parties involved when discussing Palestine. These terms aim to lower expectations. Mohammed bin Salman stated that ‘we hope it will reach a place that will ease the life of the Palestinians’, which was the only sentence about Palestine in an extensive interview mostly focused on the negotiations with Israel.  White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre commented that ‘a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia will include a serious component dealing with the fundamental issue between Israeli and Palestinian’, while the Saudi envoy to Palestine Nayef al-Sudairi insisted that ‘the Palestinian matter is a fundamental pillar’, without providing specific details These vague terms are designed to appease Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority and will later allow both parties to portray any agreement as a promise fulfilled. Moreover, the fact that there is little mention of the two-state solution or the API is almost certainly intentional, indicating that the Palestinian issue is likely to be reduced to a minimum that is tolerable for all participating sides. The probability of such a scenario is increased by the fact that Netanyahu’s government is a coalition including far-right parties that will oppose making concessions to the Palestinians, presenting one of the biggest challenges for the deal. This situation means the Saudis need an agreement that will create at least a convincing perception of solidarity with Palestine, but one that Netanyahu will be able to sell to his coalition partners.

The issues of U.S.-Saudi security guarantees, the Saudi nuclear program, and Palestine are all extremely complex in themselves; together they represent one of the most challenging acts of diplomacy, bargaining, and balancing between the international and the domestic. At the same time, they also provide an opportunity, as concessions on one issue can lead to gains on one of the other two. This complicated web of domestic and international actors and interests means that some time will pass before a deal can be reached, but it nevertheless appears attainable. Moreover, the U.S. and Israel are certainly targeting autumn/mid-2024 as the latest possible time for an announcement. Netanyahu is facing significant problems at home, including corruption charges, demonstrations of historic scale, and escalating violence in the West Bank, making him in dire need of a political victory. For Biden, announcing in mid-2024 would be politically advantageous, as it would mean brokering a peace agreement far more spectacular than the Abraham Accords just months before the presidential election, in which he will likely face the man who took credit for the 2020 deal. 

But just when, despite all the difficulties and complexities of such a normalization agreement, a positive outcome seemed possible, everything changed. 

On October 7th, 2023, Hamas, the Islamist terrorist group governing the Gaza Strip, launched a significant and unexpected attack against Israel. While speculations continue regarding the operation's objectives and the potential involvement of Hezbollah, Syria, or militant groups from the West Bank, one fact remains clear. Even if the move turns out to be suicidal for Hamas, as it seems likely, it has achieved one thing that can be labeled a victory for the group. Namely, the complete derailment of the Israeli-Saudi normalization process. Just two weeks ago, there were confident voices advocating for an Israeli embassy in Riyadh; now, it's much more likely to witness an Israeli occupation of Gaza instead. While the Biden administration insists that the deal is still attainable, the policy consensus is that the possibility of normalization has been effectively halted. While talks may continue at some point in the future, the chances of normalization during Biden's presidency have significantly diminished. This is mainly because the Palestinian issue was the most complex and challenging aspect of the U.S.-mediated Israeli-Saudi talks. Matters related to Saudi-American security guarantees and a Saudi civilian nuclear program were not simple, but Saudi insistence on some form of resolution for the Palestinian matter was the most challenging to address, and this was before October 7th. Now, as images and news of Israel bombing civilian areas in Gaza, using weapons that violate international humanitarian law, circulate and inflame sympathetic public opinion, no Arab government will be able to sell a normalization deal to its population without facing significant backlash and delegitimization of its rule. Simultaneously, Israelis would not react positively to any compromise after experiencing widespread, mass violence against the civilian population. Saudi Arabia's push for concessions on the Palestinian issue in its negotiations with Israel was difficult to achieve before the war; now, it is plainly unattainable, as the Israeli government is in no mood to make any concessions to the Palestinians. This effectively freezes the normalization talks for the foreseeable future.