Kerman Attacks: A Tragic Abbreviation or a Worrying New Norm?

On January 3rd in Kerman, Iran, a procession gathered to mark the fourth anniversary of the death of Qassim Soleimani, a Kerman-born commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). It was, however, targeted by a terrorist attack. While the initial reports of a gas explosion, and later claims of Israeli and American responsibility effectively were proven false, the Islamic State claimed responsibility. Some had doubts about this scenario due to the unusual delay in claiming responsibility for the attack, the lack of specification which branch of IS was involved and the fact that IS’ and Iran’s version of the story initially differed. However, Iranian authorities did finally confirm they found remains of the perpetrators as well as evidence confirming the IS’ version of the story – a suicide bombing. Adequate measures against the group followed, indicating Iran was truly convinced of IS’ responsibility. Namely, strengthening its eastern border and arresting 11 people involved while also confirming that one of the perpetrators was a Tajik national. All of the above indicates IS Khorasan Province (IS-KP) involvement and considering that the attack was the biggest and most tragic in Islamic Republic’s history, it begs the question if it marks a new, dangerous evolution of the group, or rather it represents a one, time event resulting from the fact that Iran’s security services were focused elsewhere. Afore answering, a short background on the IS-KP is, and reasons behind IS' general hatred towards Iran, and Soleimani specifically.

IS-KP emerged in 2015 in Afghanistan as a local branch of the Islamic State. The name ‘Khorasan’ pertains to a historical, geographical area encompassing the entire Afghanistan and parts of Iran, Central Asia and Pakistan. It generally strives to establish an Islamic State encompassing the above region and mostly recruits individuals disillusioned with other jihadist groups operating in the area such as  the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The latter fact is of relevance as it indicates the difference between IS-KP and other regional jihadist organizations. It accuses the likes of Taliban of abandoning the cause of global jihad and settling for national objectives and thus prying on members of such groups who share the sentiment. 

However, while the group talks about such issues, or the US and Israel, its operational activity is mostly limited to what has defined IS, and its previous iterations, since Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – targeting of Shia civilians, on extremist, religious grounds. Thus, while it conducts a low-intensity insurgency against the Taliban in Afghanistan, most of its activities encompass terrorist attacks against Shia populations and mosques. Iran, which attempts to play the role of a global defender of Shia's, was a natural target of choice. However, Soleimani specifically even more so, as his actions and support were crucial in defeating the IS in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, the targeting of Kerman not only had a symbolic dimension, as the birthplace of the former Quds Force commander, but also had an operational allure as it lays closer to IS-KP common area of activity.  

While the motivation behind the attack is clear, IS’ general sectarian hatred towards Shia’s and a political one towards Iran and the IRGC, the question that needs to be answered is whether this represents a new norm in the group’s capabilities and focus, or rather a one-time event. The group has targeted Iran in 2017 and 2022 already yet these, while equally tragic, represented a more limited operational capability, and there are thus three explanations to the attacks in Kerman. Either, a heightened offensive capacity on behalf of IS-KP, a diminished, defensive one on behalf of Iranian security forces, or a mixture of both. Considering, the broader geopolitical context, the second explanation appears as the most plausible. With the intensifying conflict in the Middle East, on which Iranian intelligence and security services are at the forefront, whether in Yemen or Lebanon, the focus for these agencies has been on Israel and its allies. This hence creates an extremely high possibility it simply let its guard down on other threats such as the Islamic State, unlike Israel, attacks as those in Kerman, although tragic, do not constitute a strategic threat, and no explanation is needed about how such agencies determine their priorities. The lowered attention given by Iranian intelligence and security services to threats coming from its eastern borders is likely the most plausible explanation. Moreover, even if the attack did represent an unprecedented display of capabilities, Iran has likely learned its lessons as measures applied afterwards the attack will make a repetition of January 3rd, extremely difficult for IS-KP.

The other side of the situation is that other Iranian foes such as Israel, will slightly benefit as Iran now has another active enemy to safeguard against. It stretches Iranian security forces, negatively affects the situation on borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan and presents a domestic, terrorist threat that will necessitate time and effort to deal with. Even if it was a one-off event of IS-KP taking advantage of Iran’s focus on other theatres of operation, it will still have an impact by adding another problem to the regime’s already complex situation. Moreover, it serves as a reminder that such groups even when pushed to political insignificance, still represent a threat to civilian populations, and the fragility of the situation in Afghanistan, is exactly the set of circumstances on which IS’ branches pry on for expansion.